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The Rise and Demise of an Oil Metropolis  
Kaveh Ehsani and Rasmus Christian Elling   
 
In fall 1978, Abadan’s oil refinery workers played a decisive role in the Iranian Revolution by 
joining the national mass strikes. Just two years later, Abadan and the adjoining port city of 
Khorramshahr were shelled by the invading Iraqi army and effectively destroyed during the 
Iran–Iraq war (1980–88), which scattered their population of over 600,000 as refugees across 
Iran and abroad. The bloody liberation of Khorramshahr (May 1982) turned the tide of Iraqi 
advances. Abadan’s refinery workers remarkably kept up production under constant shelling 
through eight years of war and international sanctions, earning the two cities a prominent 
place in post-revolutionary Iran’s official mythology of the “Sacred Defense.”  
 
Despite state propaganda lionizing the workers, postwar reconstruction has not been kind to 
either city.[1] Prior to the war, Khorramshahr had been Iran’s largest port, while the much 
larger Abadan was home to one of the world’s largest refineries. Both cities were major 
commercial centers in the late 1970s. A major tourist destination with posh resorts and 
nightclubs, cinemas and shopping centers [2], Abadan also boasted Iran’s second major 
international airport and a large bazaar. The region’s agricultural economy was booming with 
date plantations geared to export. Abadanis boasted of their soccer teams, leisure clubs, 
petroleum university, artists and prominent intellectuals.  
 
Abadan is now a postindustrial shell of its former glory days as a beacon of modernity: a 
cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic and progressive city that had played decisive roles in national and 
global events. Today’s Abadan resembles deindustrialized Detroit or Gary, the former US 
automobile and steel cities that fell victim to neoliberal globalization. But Abadan was also 
the target of military invasions, failed postwar reconstruction and ecological crises caused by 
global warming and human folly.  
 
Three decades after the ceasefire with Iraq, the rubble has been largely cleared away and the 
population is back to the pre-revolution levels, surpassing 300,000 in Abadan and its rural 
surroundings (Iran’s population increased from 34 to 80 million during the same period). But 
the city is plagued by environmental, social, demographic and economic crises. Critical air 
and water pollution, chronic high unemployment, widespread corruption in the public and 
financial sectors, ethnic and political discrimination and perceptions of state failure to deliver 
tangible improvements and long-term development have created a constant state of 
discontent. The disjuncture between official rhetoric and lived reality and the recognition that 
		
poor policies are responsible for the crises have created a sense of abandonment and a politics 
of despair that regularly erupts into riots. [3]  
 
If Abadan once epitomized cosmopolitan urban modernity, it has come to embody an 
opposite imaginary of dystopia underpinned by a melancholic nostalgia for a modernity that is 
in the past and a future that holds no promise except of further decline.  
 
Urban Politics of Oil and Modernity  
The story of Abadan is entwined with the turbulent histories of modernity in Iran, the Persian 
Gulf and the Middle East. From its foundation on a sandy island in the Shatt al-‘Arab River 
bordering Iran and Iraq on the eve of World War I, the city has been at the center of 
momentous events of global significance, shaped by imperialism, nation building and power 
struggles over oil.  
 
Middle East oil was first discovered in 1908 in the Zagros mountains of southwest Iran. The 
British government became the majority shareholder in the Anglo–Persian Oil Company 
(APOC, today BP) in violation of the concession granted in 1901 by Mozaffar ad-Din Shah to 
an Australian businessman.  
 
The decision to build a major refinery in Abadan to supply Britain’s war machine was made 
on the eve of World War I. While the industrial infrastructure was still being assembled, 
APOC attempted in vain to control and manage a growing population of migrants and 
refugees, as did the Iranian government in its later effort to impose control over the city. 
Abadan’s vast industrial workforce was made up of expatriate Europeans, Indian migrants 
recruited from outposts of the British Empire, dispossessed and proletarianized Bakhtiyari 
and Arab tribesmen and Iranians coming from as far as the oil fields of the Caucasus after the 
Russian Revolution of 1917.  
 
The urban politics of Abadan was thereafter shaped by relent- less struggles over the right to 
the city—of living and working conditions and management of social and political life—
between the oil company in its various permutations;[4] the autocratic central government; 
and the growing population developing novel forms of collective resistance and advancing its 
own claims and demands. Workers in the refinery, port, railways and factories were under 
constant surveillance and control by employers, but they found support among the general 
population of the city for their attempts to address social and political concerns.  
 
These entanglements made Abadan synonymous with oil and all the violent paradoxes and 
revolutionary transformations associated with it. The establishment of the massive complex of 
oil extraction and refining in southwest Iran was based on the forcible dispossession of local 
tribal and agrarian populations, but it also led to the emergence of new urban solidarities 
among destitute migrants living in the slums of the new oil cities. This new urban geography 
of oil was characterized by shocking disparities of wealth despite monumental infrastructure 
development that spurred new models of urban management elsewhere in the country. The oil 
complex created tremendous pollution and ecological degradation, but this was juxtaposed to 
		
manicured European garden-city neighborhoods, segregated social clubs and modern 
amenities like hospitals, schools and workers’ housing estates.  
 
Oil cities like Abadan suffered from heavy-handed corporate rule and constant police-state 
surveillance and repression, but they also became sites of labor activism, radical politics, and 
grassroots popular movements. Although highly segregated by class, race and occupation, 
ethnic and cultural intermingling along with the industrial labor market and urban economy 
created a cosmopolitan environment where new solidarities emerged to resist discrimination 
and injustice.[5] 
 
By the 1960s new technologies, urban planning practices and consumer products entered Iran 
through Abadan, with the city giving rise to innovations in fashion, lifestyle and popular 
culture. Through films, newspapers and posters, the Pahlavi state produced an official image 
of Abadan as the epitome of Fordist development, where hardworking families could enjoy 
prosperity and suburban comfort in the shadow of the oil complex.  
 
Revolution, War and the Aftermath  
The image of Abadan as a vanguard city of oil-driven modernity was transformed by its role 
in the 1979 revolution and then shattered by the war that followed. Although the Iranian oil 
industry had been nominally nationalized in 1973, logistic and technical operations remained 
under the effective control of multinationals. In late summer and autumn of 1978, Iranian oil 
workers joined the popular call for a mass strike and effectively shut down operations across 
the sector. The strikers’ main political demands were the full nationalization of the oil 
industry and the expulsion of all multinational oil companies and the thousands of expatriates 
who held key positions in technical, managerial and industrial operations. The strike dealt a 
fatal symbolic and economic blow to the monarchy.[6] 
 
The city’s destruction in the aftermath of the Iraqi inva- sion and the scattering of its 
population were part of a major political turning point that allowed the Islamic Republic to 
consolidate its monopoly over post-revolution politics in Iran. Like most of Iran’s war-
damaged western frontier, Abadan’s commercial economy and its industrial heart—the 
harbor, oil refinery, steel mill and petrochemical plant—were never fully rebuilt after the 
1988 ceasefire, in part due to the lack of a permanent peace treaty with Iraq. The main hubs of 
the Iranian oil industry moved elsewhere, and the once vibrant river commerce that had 
sustained major ports in Khorramshahr, Abadan and Basra in Iraq is today all but 
moribund.[7]  
 
Moreover, ill-conceived and poorly executed development projects, including massive dams, 
sugarcane agribusinesses and water transfer schemes, have caused critical water short- ages 
and pollution throughout the Khuzestan Province. The reservoir of the Gotvand dam on the 
Karun river, for example, has salt deposits that have spoiled the country’s largest river and 
main source of drinking water for Abadan, Ahvaz and Khorramshahr. In June 2018, 
Khuzestan’s representative in the Provincial Higher Council warned of the catastrophic 
consequences of the province’s water situation by stating that “Karun has become a flowing 
sewer.” A Majlis representative from Bushehr warned of possible water wars, saying that “our 
		
society is on the verge of disintegration.”[8] Significant regional environmental chemical 
contamination caused by three major wars has further exacerbated the situation.  
 
The damming and indiscriminate diversion of upstream rivers by all riparian countries—
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria— has led to the catastrophic draining of the vast marshlands of 
southern Iraq and Iran. The resulting desertification has led to widespread displacement of 
populations and recurring dust storms that appear apocalyptic in scale and intensity. The 
critical state of air quality caused by salt, dust and harmful chemicals has caused the frequent 
closing of schools, offices and power plants. The poor air quality is also blamed for the rise of 
chronic health problems in Abadan. Global warming has further exacerbated the crisis, with 
temperatures rising as high as 130°F. Some climate scientists warn that average temperatures 
may rise to levels that make the entire Persian Gulf uninhabitable.[9]  
 
Amidst these dire circumstances, displaced people who returned after the war to rebuild 
Abadan barely hang on in a dispiriting atmosphere of neglect and discontent. Even the 
establishment of the Arvand Free Zone, a large-scale industrial and commercial enclave 
aimed at reviving the moribund local economy, has failed to generate the kind of progress 
envisioned in official promotional material. Following the 2015 Iran nuclear accord, 
Petroleum Minister Bijan Namdar Zageneh promised that the lifting of international sanctions 
would finally reverse the decline of Abadan and Khuzestan by ushering in new capital 
investments. His predictions have proven hollow, as the city and the oil rich province have 
continued down the spiral of decline and despair.[10]  
 
Conflicting Imaginaries of Past and Future  
To many Iranians, and particularly those in the diaspora, Abadan is remembered through 
nostalgic narratives that gloss over the gross inequalities, injustices and discrimination that 
marred the city under British influence and Pahlavi rule. In these romanticized narratives, 
Abadan’s past is framed as a near utopia of peaceful conviviality. Its former status as a 
symbol of material progress and affluence reemerges in online communities where past and 
current residents share pictures, postcards and memories associated with the heyday of the oil 
city. In this postwar “utopia lost” narrative, Abadan’s history seems to stop sometime around 
the revolution and the Iraqi invasion; everything later is a story of loss, displacement, 
repression and abandonment.  
 
Conversely, the post-revolution state’s official narrative about Abadan begins at that 
historical moment: the heroic uprising of oil workers during the revolution, the epic resistance 
of local volunteer militias and, later, the organized forces of the Islamic Republic fighting 
foreign aggressors. In this official narrative, the loss of the city is a saga of the forces of good, 
besieged and embattled but ultimately emerging victorious from the flames of war.  
 
Yet given the intense discontent of the local population, there are signs that the state is 
searching for a more constructive and mollifying narrative than its official discourse of a 
heroic city victimized by an unjust war. In 2016, the state opened its first Petroleum Museum, 
a collection of commemorative sites across Abadan’s industrial landscape including the 
country’s first gas station and a restored art deco masterpiece that has been turned into an 
		
open air exhibition. The museum runs an online project to document the cultural, social and 
technical history of oil in Iran. Several other landmark buildings have come under national 
heritage protection, and the local tourist office has rebranded the city. These official projects 
aim to reclaim the paradoxical heritage of a turbulent past that has otherwise been kept alive 
by amateurs and ordinary citizens through documents, oral histories of Abadan and 
crowdsourced visual materials shared on social media, weblogs and other online forums.[11] 
 
The rebranding of Abadan is part of a broader attempt to close the ideological gap between 
official rhetoric in the Islamic Republic and the nationalist nostalgia of a younger generation 
longing for a mythologized pre-revolutionary past.[12] That rebranding is a symbolic (and 
hardly adequate) response to Abadanis widespread sense of betrayal and abandonment 
regarding the failed promises of reconstruction. Abadan is, in other words, an important front 
in the battle of clashing public visions about the past, present and future of Iran.  
 
In the global North, the degradations of post-industrial urban environments can provide 
unexpected opportunities. In Detroit, some vacant spaces have been repurposed for artist 
collectives and urban gardens. These grassroots initiatives may do little for legacy residents 
abandoned by the wholesale collapse of the industrial economy, but they do provide some 
green shoots of revitalization. Opportunistic politicians appropriate popular nostalgia for a 
lost golden era to legitimize neoliberal exploitation in the guise of righteous, resentful 
patriotism. Former Indiana Governor Mike Pence, for example, rode a policy of law-and-
order political backlash against the impoverished, minority population in the city of Gary to 
the position of vice president of the United States.  
 
But in the more precarious national environments of the global South, post-industrial urban 
residents and policy- makers face even greater systemic challenges, both local and 
international. Despite appearing to embrace a brighter version of Abadan’s past, the Iranian 
state has yet to create substantial change in the life of the city today. Chronic unemployment, 
environmental crises, widespread poverty, meager economic activity and perceptions of 
official corrup- tion are everyday realities for Abadanis. The government’s acknowledgment 
in its recent cultural policies that the city’s heyday was in the past has only highlighted 
Abadan’s miserable present. At the same time, the traumatic decline of a cosmopolitan 
industrial city that once embodied the promises and perils of oil-fueled modernity has altered 
the perceptions of what collective futures can be built on a lost and idealized past. The major 
challenge facing the new generation of Abadanis and other Iranians is whether the nostalgic 
memories of Abadan’s social and political past can again inspire grassroots movements and 
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